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A Plea to North Carolina: Bring Fairness to the
Assessment of Civil Battery Liability for
Defendants with Cognitive Disabilities
JOHNNY C. CHRISCOE*

In certain instances, the courts appearto apply the law of civil battery
in a confused and unfair manner to defendants with cognitive disabilities.
In cases where there is the "appearance"of a civil battery-where the
defendant causes harmful or offensive contact to the plaintiff-courts
appear to assume the existence of the requisite intent and, accordingly, the
commission of the tort. As justification, the courts frequently offer that
"the insane are liablefor their torts."
This Article agrees that a cognitive disability, or "insanity " to employ
the terminology often used by the courts, is not an affirmative defense to
intentional torts in general or to battery in particular. The Article argues,
however, that a relevant and diagnosable cognitive disability may in
certain instances have bearingon the plaintiffs ability to meet the burden
of proving the necessary, primafacie element of intent. In such instances,
fairness and the proper application of the law of battery demand that the
plaintiffmeet this burden ofproof before the case can move forward.
North Carolina cases are among those that appear to confuse the
prima facie element of intent with the affirmative defense of insanity.
However, these North Carolina cases are now decades old and ripe for a
revisit. This timing, coupled with the willingness of North Carolinacourts
to think innovatively about complex legal issues, makes the North Carolina
judiciary an excellent candidate to clarify the law of civil battery as
applied to persons with relevant and diagnosable cognitive disabilities.
This Article is a plea to North Carolinacourts to bring clarity to the law of
civil battery and fairness to the assessment of liability in defendants with
cognitive disabilities.

* Associate Professor, Campbell University School of Law. The author would like to thank
Peter Borden and Campbell Bentson for their research and support.
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INTRODUCTION

North Carolina legislators and judges frequently refuse to bow to
national majority positions and trends in tort law. For example, North
Carolina is one of the few states to continue to recognize contributory
negligence as a complete bar to recovery in negligence actions,' to continue
to recognize the heart balm torts of alienation of affections and criminal
conversation, 2 and to continue, against widespread popularity to the
contrary, to reject strict liability as a basis for recovery in an action arising
out of products liability.3

1. See, e.g., Scheffer v. Dalton, 777 S.E.2d 534, 541 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) ("In North
Carolina, a plaintiff's right to recover in a personal injury or wrongful death action is barred
upon a finding of contributory negligence." (citing Brewer v. Harris, 182 S.E.2d 345, 350

(N.C. 1971); Prior v. Pruett, 550 S.E.2d 166, 173 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), disc. rev. denied,
563 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. 2002))).
2. In 1984, the North Carolina Court of Appeals attempted to abolish alienation of
affections and criminal conversation. See Cannon v. Miller, 322 S.E.2d 780, 804 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1984). On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court
of appeals. Cannon v. Miller, 327 S.E.2d 888 (N.C. 1985) ("It appearing that the panel of
Judges of the Court of Appeals to which this case was assigned has acted under a
misapprehension of its authority to overrule decisions of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina and its responsibility to follow those decisions, until otherwise ordered by the
Supreme Court. It is therefore ordered that the petition for discretionary review is allowed
for the sole purpose of vacating the decision of the Court of Appeals purporting to abolish
the causes of action for Alienation of Affections and Criminal Conversation." (citing

Cannon, 322 S.E.2d 780)).
3. See, e.g., DAVID G.

OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW

§ 5.3, at 273 (2005) ("The

American Law Institute approved Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A at its annual
meeting in 1964 and published it the following year in volume 2 of the Second Restatement.
With a gusto unmatched in the annals of Restatements of the Law, the new doctrine swept
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North Carolina legislators and judges repeatedly demonstrate a
willingness to be innovative in addressing complex legal issues. Examples
include the creation of the North Carolina Business Court,4 designed to
address and resolve complex business issues, and the Veterans Court,' a
specialized criminal court established to work through the complicated
issues experienced by military veterans.
North Carolina is urged to once again stray from the national majority
positions in tort law and be innovative in addressing complex legal issues.
This time, the issue to be addressed is the intentional tort of battery and the
assessment of liability for adults with pertinent and diagnosable cognitive

disabilities.
While much of the discussion herein would apply to intentional torts
in general, this Article focuses on the intentional tort of battery. Battery
appears most prevalently in the cases cited in this Article. Further, battery
presents an additional issue of intent with regard to how it is applied to the
other operative elements of the tort,6 which makes battery particularly
interesting with respect to its application to defendants with diagnosable
cognitive disabilities.
For purposes of the intentional tort of battery, the majority rules and
principles of law, under certain circumstances, appear to place adults with
cognitive disabilities in a uniquely unfair position. The law of intent, while
fair on its face, often applies unfairly because of flawed legal analysis by
the courts or, in certain instances, a lack of analysis.
North Carolina currently appears to follow the flawed application of
the law, but its law is grounded in a handful of cases that are now decades
to a century old.7 The courts decided these cases at a time when the

across the face of America as courts and legislatures embraced § 402A and the bold new
doctrine that it proclaimed: 'strict' liability in tort for harm caused by defective products.
Tort law has probably never witnessed such a rapid, widespread, and altogether explosive
change in a rule and theory of legal responsibility." (footnotes omitted)). But see N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 99B-1.1 (2015) ("There shall be no strict liability in tort in product liability
actions.").
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.3 (2015) ("The Chief Justice may exercise the authority
under rules of practice prescribed pursuant to G.S. 7A-34 to designate one or more of the
special superior court judges authorized by G.S. 7A-45.1 to hear and decide complex
business cases as prescribed by the rules of practice. Any judge so designated shall be
known as a Business Court Judge and shall preside in the Business Court.").
5. Jamie Markham, Veterans Treatment Court, N.C. CRIM. L., UNC SCH. OF Gov'T:
NORTH CAROLINA CRIMINAL LAW (NOV. 12, 2014, 12:35 PM), http://nccriminallaw.sog
.unc.edu/veterans-treatment-court/ [https://perma.cc/C374-TCD4].
6. See infra notes 64-98 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of "single
intent" versus "dual intent").
7. See infra notes 127-46 and accompanying text.
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treatment of persons with cognitive disabilities, in general, was problematic
given the basic misunderstanding and lack of knowledge about such
disabilities.
Many advancements in the understanding of cognitive
disabilities have occurred since these decisions were rendered. Thus, North
Carolina is now in an excellent position to revisit these rules and to bring
honesty and fairness to the application of the law.
This Article is a plea to North Carolina to hold the plaintiff to his
burden of proving the prima facie element of intent, for purposes of civil
battery, even when the defendant has a pertinent and diagnosable cognitive
disability. Such proof requires reliable evidence from qualified witnesses
on the defendant's ability to form the requisite intent.
Therefore,
specialized courts may be necessary to fully assess such issues, or these
cases may of necessity be combined with cases in other courts to the extent
they exist, where mental health issues are common.
Part I of this Article discusses courts' tendencies to fail to analyze or
discuss the prima facie element of intent when assessing the civil battery
liability of a defendant with a cognitive disability. It further discusses their
inclination to focus instead on the inapplicability of the defense of insanity,
which they justify with the statement that "the insane are liable for their
torts." Part II explores North Carolina's early and current position on these
issues, which tends to follow the analysis found in other jurisdictions. Part
III discusses how North Carolina might lead the way in bringing fairness to
the assessment of civil battery liability for defendants with cognitive

disabilities.
I.

THE NATIONAL POSITION-A FLAWED ANALYSIS

Liability for intentional torts is grounded in a finding that the
defendant acted with intent to cause some form of harm to the plaintiff.' In
contrast, liability for negligence is grounded in the defendant's failure to
act in an objectively, and sometimes subjectively, reasonable manner that
caused harm to the plaintiff.9 Although the application of the law of
negligence and of the various intentional torts in general to defendants with
pertinent and diagnosable cognitive disabilities each may present
problems,'o this Article is concerned with the application of the law of
battery, specifically the intent requirement, to these defendants.
8. See, e.g., DAN B.
9. Id. § 26, at 50.

DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 24, at 47-48 (2000).

&

10. See, e.g., Johnny Chriscoe & Lisa Lukasik, Re-examining Reasonableness:
Negligence Liability in Adult Defendants with Cognitive Disabilities, 6 ALA. Civ. RTs.
Civ. LIBERTIES L. REv. 1, 51 (2015) (discussing issues in the application of negligence
principles to defendants with cognitive disabilities).
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Presumably, in certain instances a person with a cognitive disability is
correctly deemed liable for committing a battery." On occasion, however,
such a person may be found liable under circumstances that can be
described as unfair and unjust. In these instances, the loose application of
the rules operates to subject a person with a cognitive disability to defacto
strict liability.
A.

Intentional Conduct

Defendants with cognitive disabilities have been found liable for
committing a variety of intentional torts.1 2 Central to each tort is the
element of intent.
Intent is defined as acting with the purpose of causing some tortious
result or with substantial certainty that some tortious result will occur.' 3
Accordingly, a battery occurs when the defendant causes harmful or
offensive contact with the plaintiffs person, with the purpose of causing
such contact or with substantial certainty that such contact will occur.' 4
Further, unlike the characteristics of negligence law's reasonably prudent
11. This Article does not argue that the mere existence of a cognitive disability, or even
a diagnosed cognitive disability, necessarily precludes liability for an intentional tort in
general or a battery specifically. A defendant may have a diagnosable cognitive disability
and still be able to form the requisite intent for battery, depending on the nature of the

disability.
12. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 135, 1072-73
(5th ed. 1984) ("Thus an insane person has been held liable in a tort action for assault and
battery, false imprisonment, trespass on land, destruction of property, conversion,
wrongfully suing out an injunction, alienation of affections, infringement of a patent, and
injuries caused by the defective condition of his property." (footnotes omitted)).
13. DOBBS, supra note 8, § 24, at 49 ("Intent is not a general state of mind. One has a
purpose to, or a substantial certainty of accomplishing one or more specific objectives.").
14. See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Toward a Neuroscience Model
of Tort Law: How FunctionalNeuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. ScI.
& TECH. L. REV. 235, 257-58 (2012) ("One of the first definitions that students of tort law
learn is the meaning of intent. The most recent version of the Restatement of Torts provides
that '[a] person acts with the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with the
purpose of producing that consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the consequence
is substantially certain to result.' Thus, in a claim for battery, which is generally defined as
intentionally causing a harmful or offensive contact, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant desired to cause the harmful or offensive contact and that such contact did occur,
or that the defendant believed that the harmful or offensive contact was substantially certain
to occur. Moreover, if this requirement is met, 'it is immaterial that the actor is not inspired
by any personal hostility to the other, or the desire to injure him.' The focus of the intent is
the consequence that results, not the act itself. This meaning of intent is consistent
throughout the intentional torts." (footnotes omitted) (first quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); then
quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1965))).
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person," the foundational element of intent is defined in the same manner
regardless of who the defendant is and regardless of his physical or mental
abilities or disabilities.1 6 While the law defines intent the same for
everyone, it often applies to persons with cognitive disabilities somewhat
presumptively which leads to unfair results with little or no real analysis.
It is sometimes stated, with supporting policy reasons, that persons
with cognitive disabilities, or who are "insane" in the common parlance of
the courts, are liable for their torts.' 7 It is interesting to note the origin of
this rather conclusory statement, at least as provided by one author:
Mentally disabled persons usually have been classed with infants, and held
liable for their torts. The rule seems to have originated in a dictum in a
case decided in 1616, at a time when the action of trespass still rested upon
the older basis of strict liability without regard to the fault of the individual.
When the modem law developed to the point of holding the defendant
liable only for wrongful intent or negligence, the dictum was still repeated,
and there have been numerous decisions in accord with it.'8
The case referenced in the quoted passage is Weaver v. Ward, in
which the court stated "if a lunatick hurt a man, he shall be answerable in
trespass: and therefore no man shall be excused of a trespass."19
Regardless of this rather rocky start, the principle that persons with
cognitive disabilities are liable for their torts is firmly rooted in American
tort law.20 Moreover, for purposes of intentional torts, the law defines
15. The "reasonably prudent person" is an objective standard that does not account for
the attributes of the particular defendant. See Chriscoe & Lukasik, supra note 10, at 2-20
(discussing the historical development of differing and subjective definitions for the
reasonably prudent person as applied to children and defendants with physical disabilities,
but continuing to apply an objectively reasonably prudent person standard to adults with
cognitive disabilities).
16. DOBBS, supra note 8, § 25, at 50 ("Both children and mentally disabled persons
may be held responsible for intentional torts. The real question in intentional tort claims
against them is the same as in other suits, that is, whether they in fact entertained the intent
required to establish a particular tort." (footnotes omitted)).
17. Breunig v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619, 624 (Wis. 1970) ("The policy
basis of holding a permanently insane person liable for his tort is: (1) Where one of two
innocent persons must suffer a loss it should be borne by the one who occasioned it; (2) to
induce those interested in the estate of the insane person (if he has one) to restrain and
control him; and (3) the fear an insanity defense would lead to false claims of insanity to
avoid liability."). See also German Mut. Fire Ins. Soc'y of Liberty v. Meyer (In re
Guardianship of Meyer), 261 N.W. 211 (Wis. 1935).
18. KEETON ET AL., supranote 12, § 135, at 1072 (footnotes omitted).
19. Weaver v. Ward (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 284; Hobart 135.
20. Kaczer v. Marrero, 324 So. 2d 717, 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) ("[W]e hold that
the common law principle that an insane person is responsible in damages for his tortious
acts has not been abrogated in Florida. The principle is based not only upon the fact that, at
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intent in the same manner for all defendants making such a rule appear fair
on its face.
However, if the ultimate question is whether a person with a cognitive
disability is liable for his torts, then the penultimate question would seem
fairly to be one of whether he committed a tort in the first instance. For the
intentional tort of battery, the determinative question would be whether he
formed the requisite intent to commit the battery. This is the question
courts on occasion appear to skip in reaching the conclusion that "insane
persons are liable for their torts." 2 1 This statement presumes the
commission of an intentional tort and therefore, presumes intent on the part
of the defendant with a cognitive disability.
In the past, courts tended to label such defendants as lunatics, 22 insane
23
2
persons, or mentally deranged,24 and while such labels are a product of
common law, torts were not grounded upon the fault concept, but also upon the idea that the
victim of a wrongful act must be compensated." (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (citing

Williams v. Hays, 38 N.E. 449 (N.Y. 1894)); McIntyre v. Sholty, 13 N.E. 239, 240 (Ill.
1887) ("It is well settled that, though a lunatic is not punishable criminally, he is liable in a
civil action for any tort he may commit. However justly this doctrine may have been
originally subject to criticism, on the grounds of reason and principle, it is now too firmly
supported by the weight of authority to be disturbed."); Cross v. Kent, 32 Md. 581, 583
(1870) ("The distinction between the liability of a lunatic or insane person in civil actions
for torts committed by him, and in criminal prosecutions, is well defined, and it has always
been held, and upon sound reason, that though not punishable criminally, he is liable to a
civil action for any tort he may commit."); Williams, 38 N.E. at 452 ("The ground of the
liability is the damage caused by the tort. That is just as great, whether caused by
negligence or trespass; the injured party is just as much entitled to compensation in the one
case as in the other; and the incompetent person must, upon principles of right and justice
and of public policy, be just as much bound to make good the loss in the one case as the
other; and I have found no case which makes the distinction."); Shedrick v. Lathrop, 172 A.
630, 632 (Vt. 1934) ("Insanity of the defendant is no defense to the award of compensatory
damages. An insane person is liable in damages for his torts." (citing Morse v. Crawford,
17 Vt. 499 (1845); 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE

§ 65 (D. Avery Haggard ed., 4th ed.
1932); Seals v. Snow, 254 P. 348 (Kan. 1927))).
21. See, e.g., Carter v. Scott, 750 S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) ("[A]n insane
person is liable for his torts the same as a sane person . . . ." (quoting Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co.
v. Hall, 52 S.E. 679, 684 (Ga. 1905)) (citing Continental Cas. Co. v. Parker, 307 S.E.2d 744
(Ga. Ct. App. 1983))); Banks v. Dawkins, 339 So. 2d 566, 568 (Miss. 1970) ("It is the
general rule in this and other states that, although a person may be suffering from a mental
condition so as to be insane, nevertheless he is required to respond in compensatory
damages for injuries resulting from his torts." (citing Feld v. Borodofski, 40 So. 816 (Miss.
1906))).
22. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Buckmaster, 32 Vt. 652, 661 (1860) ("[A] lunatic is liable for
his torts.").
23. See, e.g., Seals v. Snow, 254 P. 348, 349 (Kan. 1927) ("[A]n insane person is civilly
liable for his torts.").
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT
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their time, the courts would then make the blanket statement that they are
all liable for their torts.25 The tendency to wrap the intent element into the
denial of an affirmative defense of insanity appears to relieve the plaintiff
of its duty to prove the presence of actual and subjective intent as part of
the plaintiff's prima facie case of battery.26 While this Article does not take
issue with the denial of insanity as an affirmative defense to a civil battery,
in certain instances the failure to require proof of actual intent by the
plaintiff may result in intentional tort liability where the defendant acted
only negligently.2 7 Moreover, such a tendency may result in an application
of de facto strict liability in instances where the harm to the plaintiff was
purely accidental.
B.

McGuire v. Almy

A notable illustration is the 1937 case of McGuire v. Almy. 28 In this
case, a registered nurse sued an "insane person" 29 who was a patient under
her care. 30 Upon hearing a crashing sound coming from the defendant's
room, the sound of the defendant breaking furniture, and while knowing the
defendant was "ugly, violent and dangerous," the plaintiff entered the
defendant's room to remove the broken debris so the defendant would not
hurt herself.3 ' The defendant then struck the plaintiff with a piece of the
broken furniture, and the plaintiff sued for civil assault and battery. 32 The
defendant verbally threatened the plaintiff,33 thus admittedly there was at
least some proof that the defendant was capable of forming the requisite
intent to commit a civil battery. Nonetheless, it is the court's general
discussion of the liability of the "insane" that is relevant to this Article.

24. See, e.g., McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Mass. 1937).
25. See id. at 763 ("For this case it is enough to say that where an insane person by his
act does intentional damage to the person or property of another he is liable for that damage
in the same circumstances in which a normal person would be liable.").

26. See id.
27. While, at first, it would seem to make little difference that the defendant is deemed
liable for an intentional tort where he actually committed only an act of negligence,
particularly with regard to those with cognitive disabilities because they are generally not
liable for punitive damages. One fact that makes a tremendous difference is that liability
insurance generally precludes coverage for harm caused intentionally by an insured. See
infra note 162.
28. McGuire, 8 N.E.2d at 760.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 761.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 763.
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In affirming a verdict for the plaintiff,34 the court began with a
recitation of the common principles regarding persons with cognitive
disabilities and their torts:
[W]e find that courts in this country almost invariably say in the broadest
terms that an insane person is liable for his torts. As a rule no distinction is
made between those torts which would ordinarily be classed as intentional
and those which would ordinarily be classed as negligent, nor do the courts
discuss the effect of different kinds of insanity or of varying degrees of
capacity as bearing upon the ability of the defendant to understand the
particular act in question or to make a reasoned decision with respect to it,
although it is sometimes said that an insane person is not liable for torts
requiring malice of which he is incapable. 35
Holding persons with cognitive disabilities liable for intentional torts
without considering "the effect of different kinds of insanity or of varying
degrees of capacity"36 or the "ability of the defendant to understand the
particular act in question or to make a reasoned decision with respect to
it," 3 7 risks establishing liability without intent. This, in essence, results in a
form of strict liability. In concluding that mental capacity is irrelevant to
liability, the court gives little concern to the necessity of proving the prima
facie element of intent and instead focuses on the admittedly inapplicable
defense of insanity.
Furthering the point that intentional tort liability for such defendants is
a blanket conclusion rather than the product of reasoned analysis, the
McGuire court observed with great candor that "[t]hese decisions are rested
more upon grounds of public policy and upon what might be called a
popular view of the requirements of essential justice than upon any attempt
to apply logically the underlying principles of civil liability to the special
instance of the mentally deranged." 38 Further, the court acknowledged the
"suggestion that courts are loath to introduce into the great body of civil
litigation the difficulties in determining mental capacity which it has been
found impossible to avoid in the criminal field." 39
The McGuire court also noted the criticism of the rule and the reason
for that criticism:
The rule established in these cases has been criticized severely by certain
eminent text writers both in this country and in England, principally on the
ground that it is an archaic survival of the rigid and formal mediaeval
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Jd at 764.
Id at 762.
Id
IM.
IM.
IM.
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conception of liability for acts done, without regard to fault, as opposed to
what is said to be the general modem theory that liability in tort should rest
upon fault.40

Nonetheless, the court rationalized application of the rule by
explaining that it was consistent with holding infants liable for intentional
torts 4 '

and by explaining that fault is not in this day a "universal

prerequisite to liability." 4 2 The court, again with great candor, then
rationalized the rule with the legal thinking that has allowed the rule to
exist these many years: "[I]t would be difficult not to recognize the
persuasive weight of so much authority so widely extended." 4 3
McGuire highlights several important points regarding the liability of
persons with cognitive disabilities for intentional torts.
First, at least the older cases-from which the pertinent rules
developed and that are still used today-generally treat persons with
cognitive disabilities as though their disabilities are the same. They labeled
the individuals as lunatics, mentally incompetent, or insane and held them
liable without regard to the nature or extent of their cognitive disabilities. 4 4
Second, once so labeled, and in the apparent absence of the
requirement of proof of actual intent, courts distinguished between
intentional and negligent conduct on the part of persons with cognitive
disabilities presumably based more on conduct than on mental state. For
example, if a person with a cognitive disability engaged in conduct that
would suggest an intentional tort if performed by a person without a
cognitive disability, the court would draw the conclusion that the person
with a cognitive disability acted intentionally. The court would reach this
conclusion, without individual case by case analysis and without regard to
whether the person did or did not harbor the requisite intent to commit the
tort at issue.45

Third, while the labels used to classify persons with cognitive
disabilities are perhaps more sensitive today, the blanket rule of liability
without discussing the presence of actual intent largely remains the same. 4 6
Fourth, the first three points suggest the risk that, by consuming the
element of intent within the inapplicable defense of insanity rather than as
40. Id.
41. Id. at 763.
42. Id. Although unclear, here the court presumably refers to applications of strict
liability.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 762.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 763. While McGuire is now eighty years old, the rule it promulgated remains
largely unchanged. See, e.g., infra note 53.
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part of the plaintiffs prima facie case, a person's cognitive disability
becomes irrelevant. Accordingly, such evidence would likely be deemed
inadmissible at trial.4 7 The same rule would apply in federal courts 48 as
well as in North Carolina courts.49
Fifth, the courts' notions of broader justice and local convenience
make it undesirable, to this day, for the courts to entertain thoughts of
meaningful changes in the analysis. 0
These observations should raise concerns about the largely fault-based
tort system that has dominated tort law in the United States for decades. 5
In fact, the principle that the "insane are liable for their torts" appears to be
more of an explanation for straying from a fault-based tort system than an
affirmance of that system.5 2
In a fault-based system, so long as intent is applied fairly across the
board of potential defendants, if a person acts with intent to commit the
conduct that defines an intentional tort then he should be deemed liable,
without regard to whether he has a cognitive disability. For example, if a
defendant acts with the purpose of causing harmful or offensive contact or
with substantial certainty that it will occur, then he is liable for battery
regardless of a cognitive disability.

47.
STAT.

See FED. R. EVID. 402 (deeming only relevant evidence admissible); N.C. GEN.

§ 8C-402 (2015) (deeming only relevant evidence admissible in North Carolina

courts).
48. FED. R. EVID. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action."). FED. R. EVID. 402 ("Irrelevant evidence is not

admissible.").
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-401 ('"Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8C-402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.").
50. McGuire, 8 N.E.2d at 762.
51. DOBBS, supra note 8, § 1, at 2 ("Tort liability can be defined in part by the grounds
on which it is invoked. The term 'tort' is derived from the Latin roots meaning 'twisted,' as
if to say tortious conduct is twisted conduct, conduct that departs from the existing norm.
As the word itself suggests, torts are traditionally associated with wrongdoing in some moral
sense. In the great majority of cases today, tort liability is grounded in the conclusion that
the wrongdoer was at fault in a legally recognizable way. It is not ordinarily enough to
impose liability that the defendant has merely caused harm by accident or happenstance; he
must also be at fault. This fault approach is often associated with ideals of freedom; you
will be free to act without liability, so long as you are not at fault in your actions.").
52. See Yancey v. Maestri, 155 So. 509, 511 (La. Ct. App. 1934) (noting "[t]he
common law considers the effect of the insane person's act, while the civil law regards the
cause of it. The difference of view is the result of the method of approach which the two
schools of thought have pursued.").
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However, the frequently repeated maxim that the "insane" are liable
for their torts,53 in itself, arouses some suspicion. If the court proves that
the defendant is capable of acting with intent and if the court proves he has
actually acted with intent, why is it necessary to single out the "insane"
with a special principle that they are liable for their torts? Perhaps because
they sometimes are held liable for the appearance of intent rather than
proof of its existence. If the defendant with a cognitive disability commits
an act that ordinarily would appear to be committed with the requisite
intent to support liability-walking up to an individual and punching
him-the disabled defendant is deemed liable, with the maxim supplanting
proof of actual intent.
Also problematic is the fact that, similar to the McGuire court, other
courts deem it necessary to offer strained justifications for holding
defendants with cognitive disabilities liable.54 If the defendant acted with
actual intent to commit the basis of an intentional tort, battery for instance,
no other justification is needed to hold him liable. Yet, apparently in the
absence of a finding of true intent supported by expert evidence on the
issue, the strained justifications continue:
A number of different explanations have been given for the liability of the
mentally disabled, none of which has gone unchallenged. It has been said
that "where one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, it should be
borne by the one who occasioned it." So far as this is anything more than
an historical survival, it represents a conclusion that it is better that the
estate of the lunatic should be taken to give compensation for the damage
he has done than that it should remain to be administered by guardians for
his own incompetent benefit. It has been said also that if he is held liable,
his custodians and those interested in his estate will be stimulated to keep
him in order; and that since insanity is easily feigned, there would be too
much temptation to pretend it. Coupled with this is perhaps an unexpressed

53. See Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468, 469-70 (Conn. 1988) ("The majority of
jurisdictions that have considered this issue have held insane persons liable for their
intentional torts." (footnote omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895J (AM.
LAW INST. 1965))); Carter v. Scott, 750 S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013) ("the rule is
that an insane person is liable for his torts" (quoting Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 52 S.E.
679 (Ga. 1905))); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams ex rel Williams, 804 P.2d 1374, 1378
(Kan. 1991) ("An insane person who shoots and kills another is civilly liable in damages to
those injured by his tort." (quoting Seals v. Snow, 254 P. 348 (Kan. 1927))); Banks v.
Dawkins, 339 So. 2d 566, 568 (Miss. 1976) ("[A]1though a person may be suffering from a
mental condition so as to be insane, nevertheless he is required to respond in compensatory
damages for injuries resulting from his torts." (citing Feld v. Borodofski, 40 So. 816 (Miss.
1905))).
54. See supranote 20 and accompanying text.
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fear of introducing into the law of torts the confusion and unsatisfactory
55
tests attending proof of insanity in criminal cases.

In a fault-based tort system, fault, as evidenced by intent for purposes
of the intentional torts in general and for battery in particular, is itself
sufficient justification to hold a defendant liable for committing a tort. The
presence of actual intent for purposes of intentional torts makes it
unnecessary to engage in crystal-ball predictions that liability will make the
defendant's guardians more likely to keep him in order. 5 6 Requiring actual
intent also makes it unnecessary to rest liability upon some general
concern, applicable to all areas of tort law, that the defendant might fake
his disability, 7 or to base liability on a generalized fear that actual analysis
of mental capacity might become as confusing as proof of insanity in
criminal cases. 5' However, if liability is grounded in something other than
proof of actual intent-such as by confusing the necessity of intent with the
inapplicability of insanity as a defense-then such justifications may exist
to help overlook the unfair treatment of those with cognitive disabilities.
Particularly telling is the "two innocent persons" explanation. 59 This
justification suggests the application of strict liability. In a fault-based tort
system, "innocent persons" are not held liable for harm caused accidentally
and without fault, unless they are subject to strict liability.60 It is at best
odd to use a strict liability rationale to justify holding defendants with
cognitive disabilities liable for either negligence or intentional torts.
The rather conclusory statement that all insane persons are liable for
their torts, without individual assessment, is also likely a product of deeper
analytical problems inherent to the intentional torts. These problems are
particularly present in the tort of battery, perhaps the most frequent tort for
which persons with cognitive disabilities might be sued.
One such problem arises from the practicalities of trial practice and
proof of intent. Rarely would a defendant in an intentional tort action
admit during direct or cross examination that he acted with the intent,

55. KEETON ET AL., supra note 12,

§

135, at 1073 (footnotes omitted).

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., Chriscoe & Lukasik, supra note 10, at 51 ("[T]ort law traditionally
compensates the plaintiff when the plaintiff is legally entitled to compensation. Tort law
does not compensate the plaintiff every time she suffers harm. Loosely speaking, the
plaintiff is entitled to compensation only where the defendant acted with fault or where the
defendant engaged in conduct to which strict liability applies, assuming no defenses are
present." (footnotes omitted)).
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purpose, or substantial certainty of causing harm to the plaintiff.61 Thus, if
the defendant stands two feet from the plaintiff and throws a punch in the
plaintiff's direction that breaks the plaintiff's nose, his expected testimony
might be that he did not want to harm the plaintiff.
However, the jury can disregard the defendant's self-serving
testimony of his intent, assess the evidence that the defendant was standing
two feet away from the plaintiff when he threw a punch in his direction and
hit him on the nose, and conclude that the defendant acted with the
requisite intent to commit a battery. The defendant's subjective intent is
determined circumstantially and somewhat objectively by his conduct. 6 2
Now, if the defendant happened to have a pertinent and diagnosable
cognitive disability that precluded him from actually forming such intent, a
jury might reach the same conclusion-that the defendant had
intent-based on the defendant's conduct and without regard to his
cognitive disability. In the absence of any expert testimony regarding the
defendant's ability to actually form the requisite intent to commit the
intentional tort, there is no evidence for the jury to consider and assess
other than the defendant's objective conduct. Of course, this outcome
would be particularly predictable where evidence of the cognitive disability
was not even admissible because deemed irrelevant under the rule that
"insane" persons are liable for their torts. 6 3
The distinction between the two defendants in the above hypotheticals
is critical to the point. In the first hypothetical, the defendant's contention
was not that he was incapable of forming the requisite intent, but that he
factually did not form the requisite intent. In this instance, use of the
defendant's conduct as circumstantial evidence of intent is appropriate.
The second defendant's contention was that he was simply incapable
of forming the requisite intent in the first instance. This contention would
at least appear to demand proof to the jury through expert testimony,
whether favorable or unfavorable to the defendant, that the defendant was

61. Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of Tort Doctrine and the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
54 VAND. L. REv. 1413, 1424-25 (2001) ("Since we cannot know with certainty whether
another person has acted 'purposefully or knowingly,' the determination of intent is a matter
of inference. Proof of purposeful or knowing conduct must, as Holmes stressed, hinge on
whether the facts are such that a reasonable person would have known that his conduct
would lead to harm, or that the probability of harm flowing from his conduct was very high.
Viewed in this way, the determination of intent is not very different from the determination
of negligence. Since defendants will not walk into court and admit intent or negligence,
both require proof of facts that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
defendant acted under the requisite mental state." (footnote omitted)).

62. See id.
63. See supranotes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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or was not capable of forming the requisite intent to commit a battery.
Instead, the cases at least appear to move to the same conclusion of liability
for both such defendants based largely on conduct serving as circumstantial
evidence of intent.
C.

The Unique Problems in Battery

One analytical problem, unique to the intentional tort of battery, may
wrongly influence liability for all potential defendants, particularly
defendants with cognitive disabilities. Battery raises the question of how
the element of intent applies to the remaining elements of the tort. Battery
is generally defined as acting with intent to cause, and actually causing,
harmful or offensive contact. 64 The question is whether the plaintiff must
prove only that the defendant intended to cause contact with the plaintiff
and that the contact resulted in harm or offense, or whether the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant intended the contact and that he also
intended the harm or offense.
One writer described the question as one of "single intent" and "dual
intent":
In particular, several torts scholars have recently debated the question of
whether battery does (and should) require both intent to cause a bodily
contact and intent to cause either harm or offense ("dual intent") or whether
it is sufficient that the defendant intends a bodily contact that turns out to
be either harmful or offensive ("single intent"). 65
Courts vary, and if a court does make any effort to analyze the liability
of persons with cognitive disabilities on a case by case basis rather than
through conclusory statements, the liability of such a defendant may hinge
on the approach a court chooses to follow. 6 6 If liability is based on the
intent to make contact with another, such intent would seem to be satisfied,
at least circumstantially, by the mere appearance that the defendant's act
was volitional and not involuntary.67 On the other hand, if liability for
battery is based upon proof that the defendant intended to bring about a
particular consequence-harm or offense-then the question of intent
involves a deeper consideration of the mental state of the defendant and his
capacity to understand and appreciate those consequences.

64. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 8, § 28, at 52-53.
65. Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and
Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REv. 1585, 1588 (2012).
66. See infra Section I.C and Section I.D.
67. Of course, the tort of battery requires a volitional act, but that alone is insufficient to
create blameworthiness without the intent to cause harm or offense.
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In the case of Wagner v. State,68 the defendant's employees were
escorting a "mentally handicapped man" through a store when he attacked
the plaintiff, grabbing her hair and throwing her to the floor. 6 9 The plaintiff
sued the Utah State Development Center for failing to supervise the
attacker, who was the defendant's patient.70
The state contended the man's conduct constituted intentional battery
and that it was, therefore, not liable under state law providing tort
immunity to the state for intentional torts.7 Pertinent to this contention
was the defendant's argument that a battery occurs where a person intends
contact that results in harm or offense, but that the person need not also
intend the harm or offense.72
The plaintiff argued that battery requires intent to make contact and
intent to cause the harm or offense.73 The plaintiff conceded that her
attacker acted with intent to cause contact but argued her attacker still did
not commit a battery.74 Her argument was that, because battery also
requires proof that the attacker intended harm or offense, her attacker was
mentally incapable of forming the intent to cause harm or offense.
Thus, squarely before the court was the issue of whether battery
requires proof only of intent to make contact or also requires proof of intent
to cause harm or offense.76
The court, relying largely on the Restatement (Second) of Torts7 7 and
to some extent on case law, concluded that battery requires only proof of
intent to cause contact of which results in harm or offense.7 ' Thus, battery
requires proving single intent and not that the harm or offense was also
intended by the defendant.7 9

68. Wagner v. State, 122 P.3d 599 (Utah 2005).
69. Id. at 601.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 603.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
subject to liability to another for battery if (a) he
offensive contact with the person of the other
apprehension of such a contact, and (b) a harmful
directly or indirectly results.").
78. Wagner, 122 P.3d at 603.
79. Id. See Moore, supra note 65.
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A similar case with a like result is White v. University of Idaho.so In
White, the defendant, a piano professor, touched the plaintiff on her back.'
The unexpected contact resulted in serious injuries to the plaintiff,
including "thoracic outlet syndrome on the right side of her body, requiring
the removal of the first rib on the right side." 8 2 She also suffered from
"scarring of the brachial plexus nerve which necessitated the severing of
the scalenus anterior muscles."83 While the defendant admitted that he
intentionally touched the plaintiff, he contended that his purpose was to
demonstrate a piano technique.84 The plaintiff contended that the contact
was without consent and that "she found it offensive. "15
Similar to Wagner, the plaintiff in White argued that the defendant's
conduct constituted negligence instead of the intentional tort of battery.8 6
The plaintiff made this argument because she also sued the defendant's
employer, the University of Idaho; if the defendant's act was deemed to be
battery, the university would be immune from liability. 7 Accordingly,
directly before the court was the issue of whether battery requires only
proof of intent to cause contact ("single intent") or proof of intent to cause
contact and intent to cause harm or offense ("double intent").
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed a partial summary judgment for
the university.8 9 Specifically, it held that the intentional tort of battery does
"not require an intent to injure or harm, but merely an intent to do the act
complained of," which in this case was contact with the plaintiff 90
Cases such as Wagner9 1 and White 92 seem to miss the fault concept
embodied in the intentional tort of battery. They require only intent to
cause contact that ultimately results in harm or offense but do not require
proof of intent to cause harm or offense. It is the intent to harm or offend
that makes the defendant who commits a battery truly blameworthy. 93
Requiring only the intent to cause contact subjects the defendant, with or

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

White v. Univ. of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108 (Idaho 1990).
Id. at 109.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id See also Moore, supra note 65 (discussing single and double intent).
White, 797 P.2d at 111.
Id (relying on Rajspic v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 1167 (Idaho 1986)).
Supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 8, § 30, at 59.
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without a cognitive disability, to liability for an intentional tort where he
may have been merely negligent or imposes strict liability where the
defendant acted innocently.
Consider the hypothetical of two college roommates, X and Y.
Neither, for purposes of generalization, have a cognitive disability. They
return to their apartment one evening after having dinner. Roommate X
steps forward to unlock their apartment door when he makes it obvious that
he does not have his key to their apartment. Roommate Y, sensing the
problem, says, "Here, catch." He then, simultaneously with his words,
tosses his apartment key to Roommate X. Roommate X, however, while
hearing Roommate Y's words, has only enough reaction time to turn
toward Roommate Y. The apartment key strikes Roommate X in the eye,
causing significant harm.
Roommate Y, in this hypothetical, acted with the intent to cause
contact with Roommate X, albeit not contact with Roommate X's eye.
While Roommate Y did not intend to cause harm or offense to Roommate
X, under cases such as Wagner and White, Roommate Y is liable to
Roommate X for the intentional tort of battery.
If such facts were submitted to a jury along with an instruction for
liability based on negligence, a jury might conclude that Roommate Y
acted negligently.
Alternatively, it might conceivably conclude that
Roommate Y did not fail to act as a reasonably prudent person under the
circumstances. However, the law of Wagner94 and White9 5 would hold
Roommate Y liable for the much more egregious tort of battery. In effect,
requiring only proof of intent to cause contact may result in intentional tort
liability for what might otherwise be negligent or innocent conduct.
While few cases or authors address the distinction between the intent
to cause contact and the intent to cause both the contact and the harm or
offense, at least one author has noted the problem:
The Restatement's formula is perhaps ambiguous, but it probably means
intent to harm or offend as well as an intent to touch is required. This is in
line with the fault principle and also with the freedom to act encouraged by
that principle. To see this, suppose that in the illustrative example, the
defendant is a wife who hugs her husband, but the hug unexpectedly causes
a bone spur to break off and impinge upon a nerve in her husband's spine.
If the wife intended neither harm nor any violation of the husband's
implicit consent to friendly physical contact, the intent is not tortious or
faulty. Except under a general regime of strict liability that is inconsistent

94. Supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
95. Supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
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with the fault principle, the physical contact alone seems to furnish no
ground for liability.96

The hypothetical offered in this quotation makes several direct points.
Given the choice between non-liability and liability for negligence, the wife
would likely escape liability. This is so because, assuming she had no
foreseeability of the potential harm to her husband, the wife did not fail to
act as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. However, if
liability for battery becomes an option, and if intent is satisfied by intent to
cause contact followed by consequential-but-unintended harm or offense,
the wife would be liable for the intentional tort of battery.
The distinction between battery and negligence is not the measure of
damages but rather the frame of mind with which the defendant conducts
himself. It seems inconsistent with the notion of fault-based liability for a
defendant to be held liable for battery-generally considered to be more
egregious conduct than negligence-unless the defendant intended harm,
or at least offense.
Courts should refrain from holding defendants with cognitive
disabilities liable for intentional torts, simply inferring intent from conduct,
and relying on an archaic and generalized maxim-likely sourced from
dictum97 -that the "insane" are liable for their torts. However, even if a
court analyzes the defendant's conduct on an individual level, the single
intent approach to battery places the defendant in only a slightly better
position than reliance on an outdated maxim. As stated earlier,9 8 proof of

intent to cause contact would seem to require little more than proof of
volitional body movement.
D.

A Casefor the Times

In cases involving intentional torts allegedly committed by defendants
with cognitive disabilities, courts should adopt the dual intent
requirement.99
Specifically, they should require proof that (1) the
defendant

acted with actual,

subjective intent-meaning

to act with

96. DOBBS, supranote 8, § 30, at 59.
97. KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 135, at 1072; see supra text accompanying note 18.
98. Supra text accompanying note 67.
99. See Moore, supra note 65, at 1631-32 ("There are . . some recurring situations in
which the choice between single and dual intent is likely to make a significant difference.
These situations involve ... those defendants, such as the insane or children, who may have
the capacity to intend a bodily contact, but who either lack the capacity or are unlikely to
appreciate that the intended contact will be either harmful or offensive."). But see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 102 (AM. LAW INST. Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015) ("The
intent required for battery is the intent to cause a contact with the person of another. The
actor need not intend to cause harm or offense to the other." (emphasis added)).
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purpose or substantial certainty' 0 0-and, at least for purposes of battery,
(2) that the defendant's intent was not only to cause contact but also to
cause either harm or offense.
At least one relatively recent case leads the way in requiring such dual
proof. In White v. Muniz,'o' the eighty-three year-old defendant, Everly,
lived in an assisted living facility.1 0 2 The plaintiff, Muniz, worked as a
shift supervisor for the facility.1 03 One day Everly struck Muniz in the jaw
as Muniz attempted to change Everly's adult diaper.1 04 The following day,
a physician determined that Everly suffered from "[p]rimary degenerative
dementia of the Alzheimer type, senile onset, with depression."'0 Muniz
sued Everly for assault and battery, as well as Everly's personal
representative, White, for negligence.1 0 6
The trial court instructed the jury that "[a] person intends to make a
contact with another person if she does an act for the purpose of bringing
about such a contact, whether or not she also intends that the contact be
harmful or offensive." 0 7 Nonetheless, the trial court further instructed the
jury that "[y]ou may find that she acted intentionally if she intended to do
what she did, even though her reasons and motives were entirely irrational.
However, she must have appreciatedthe offensiveness of her conduct." 0 8
From a jury verdict favorable to defendants Everly and White,1 09 the
plaintiff appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals." 0 The Colorado
Supreme Court explained the decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals:
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
remanded the case for a new trial. The court of appeals reasoned that most
states continue to hold mentally deficient [defendants] liable for their
intentional acts regardless of their ability to understand the offensiveness of
their actions. "[W]here one of two innocent persons must suffer a loss, it
should be borne by the one who occasioned it." The court of appeals

100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) ("The word
'intent' is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the actor desires to
cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially
certain to result from it.").
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814 (Colo. 2000) (en banc).
Id. at 815.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 815-16 (emphasis original).
Id. at 816.
See id.
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reasoned that insanity may not be asserted as a defense to an intentional
tort, and thus, concluded that the trial court erred in "instructing the jury
that Everly must have appreciated the offensiveness of her conduct.""'
It is worth observing, at this point in the discussion of the history of
the case, that the court of appeals' opinion represents all that is wrong in
the assessment of intentional tort liability for defendants with cognitive
disabilities, especially with regard to the tort of battery.
In the tradition of older cases, the court of appeals placed the
defendant, Everly, in her presumed appropriate class and then generalized
that "most states continue to hold mentally deficient [defendants] liable for
their intentional acts."1 2 This "analysis" involves no discussion of whether
such defendants actually acted with subjective intent even where they have
no "ability to understand the offensiveness of their actions."" 3 The court
then justified this principle with the traditional "where one of two innocent
persons must suffer a loss",114 language that is, arguably, a better

justification for strict liability.
On appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, the court stated the issue
before it: "The question we here address is whether an intentional tort
requires some proof that the tortfeasor not only intended to contact another
person, but also intended that the contact be harmful or offensive to the
other person.""' The court addressed the issue without regard to the
defendant's cognitive disability before turning to the proof of intent
required for a defendant with such a disability.11 6 By offering a more
intensive analysis for defendants with cognitive disabilities, the court's
opinion could serve as a model for the assessment of intentional tort
liability for this class of defendants.
The court began by observing that "[s]tate courts and legal
commentators generally agree that an intentional tort requires some proof
that the tortfeasor intended harm or offense.""'7 With particular regard to
battery, the court added:
Historically, the intentional tort of battery required a subjective desire on
the part of the tortfeasor to inflict a harmful or offensive contact on another.
Thus, it was not enough that a person intentionally contacted another
resulting in a harmful or offensive contact. Instead, the actor had to
111. Id. at 816 (citation omitted) (quoting Muniz v. White, 979 P.2d 23, 25-26 (Colo.
App. 1998), rev'd, 999 P.2d 819 (Colo. 2000) (en banc)).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting Muniz, 979 P.2d at 25).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 816-18.
117. Id. at 816 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 8; DOBBS, supranote 8, § 30).
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understand that his contact would be harmful or offensive. The actor need
not have intended, however, the harm that actually resulted from his action.
Thus, if a slight punch to the victim resulted in traumatic injuries, the actor
would be liable for all the damages resulting from the battery even if he
only intended to knock the wind out of the victim. 18
The court then noted that, recently, some courts have defined the tort
of battery as a single intent tort.11 9 That is, intent to cause contact is all that
is necessary as opposed to defining battery as a double intent tort requiring
proof of intent to cause contact and intent to cause harm or offense.1 20
Most importantly, the court noted the impact a single intent definition
might have on defendants with cognitive disabilities, stating: "[W]hen
evaluating the culpability of particular classes of defendants, such as the
very young and the mentally disabled, the intent required by a jurisdiction
becomes critical."121
The court concluded this portion of its opinion by finding that
Colorado law "requires the jury to conclude that the defendant both
intended the contact and intended it to be harmful or offensive."1 2 2 Upon
deciding the necessary intent for liability, the court turned its attention to
the requirement of actual proof of subjective intent, particularly with regard
to defendants with cognitive disabilities:
A jury can, of course, find a mentally deficient person liable for an
intentional tort, but in order to do so, the jury must find that the actor
intended offensive or harmful consequences. As a result, insanity is not a
defense to an intentional tort according to the ordinary use of that term, but
is a characteristic, like infancy, that may make it more difficult to prove the
intent element of battery. Our decision today does not create a special rule
for the elderly, but applies Colorado's intent requirement in the context of a
woman suffering the effects of Alzheimer's.
With regard to the intent element of the intentional torts of assault and
battery, we hold that regardless of the characteristics of the alleged
tortfeasor, a plaintiff must prove that the actor desired to cause offensive or
harmful consequences by his act.1 23

118. Id. at 816-17 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
16(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
119. Id. at 817 (emphasis in original) (citing Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1360
(Del. 1995); White v. Univ. of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108, 111 (Idaho 1990)).
120. See id.
121. M
122. Id. at 818.
123. Id. at 818-19.
OF TORTS §
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Critically, the court made clear that it was not creating a new or
"special rule for the elderly."1 2 4 The young, the elderly, nor those with
cognitive disabilities need new rules regarding intentional tort liability.
The statements of law are currently fair, but their application needs a
cleansing clarification. First, intent, for purposes of battery, must be
applied in such a way to make the defendant's conduct blameworthy, or to
require fault. Specifically, the necessary intent must be dual intent, both
intent to cause contact and the intent to cause harm or offense. Second, the
courts need to require the plaintiff to prove the defendant had such actual,
subjective intent, regardless of the defendant's age and regardless of the
presence or absence of a cognitive disability.
As the court noted,
"insanity" may not be a defense to intentional tort, but it is not entirely
irrelevant.1 25 Evidence of a cognitive disability is wholly relevant to the
plaintiff's proof of intent in the prima facie intentional tort case.1 2 6
II.

NORTH CAROLINA'S POSITION

North Carolina is rather ideally positioned to bring the assessment of
intentional tort liability for persons with cognitive disabilities into modem
times for three reasons: (1) It appears that it already requires proof of intent
to cause contact and proof of intent to cause harm or offense for purposes
of battery;1 27 (2) its application of the law of intent for the purpose of
assessing the liability of the "insane," though inaccurate, is sufficiently
dated to be ripe for a revisit;1 28 and (3) its legislators and judges appear to
be amenable to innovative thinking to resolve complex legal questions.1 29
A.

Intent and Cognitive Disabilities

North Carolina's approach to the assessment of intentional tort
liability for persons with cognitive disabilities is grounded primarily in a
couple of cases that are decades old and which, as might be expected,
exhibit the same summary and conclusory analysis found in other cases of
the time.
In the 1910 case of Moore v. Horne,130 the defendant "assaulted the
plaintiff with a pistol and injured him."131 The defendant was subsequently

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 818.
Id.
Id.
See Andrews v. Peters, 330 S.E.2d 638, 641 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
See Moore v. Home, 69 S.E. 409, 410 (N.C. 1910).

129. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.

130. Moore, 69 S.E. 409.
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adjudicated "insane,"132 and the plaintiff brought suit against him for the
injuries he suffered.1 33 The defendant later appealed from a verdict against
him at trial.1 34 Pertinent to the court's analysis was the fact that plaintiff
claimed only compensatory and not punitive damages.1 35
The court began with basic statements regarding tort liability of
defendants with cognitive disabilities that were traditional for the time:
The plaintiff does not claim punitive damages, but actual or compensatory
damages only. A lunatic is liable in a civil action for any tort which he
may commit. The proper measure of damages in an action against a lunatic
for tort committed by him is compensation for the injuries sustained. It
cannot include punitive damages.136

Of significant interest to this Article is the fact that the court cited
with approval the 1887 Illinois case of McIntyre v. Sholty, 137 a case that
also involved harm caused by a "lunatic."1 38 Regarding the McIntyre
decision, the Moore court stated that "[t]he court excluded the evidence of
insanity in the case, and the ruling of the trial court was affirmed. An
insane person is just as responsible for his torts as a sane person."139
From Moore and its reliance upon McIntyre, North Carolina
apparently developed the rule that not only are the "insane" liable for their
intentional torts, but that evidence of their disability is not even admissible
at trial presumably because those cases deemed it irrelevant.
Such a rule of inadmissibility makes legal sense within the context of
the often-stated maxim that "insanity" is not a defense to intentional torts.
However, if the plaintiff must prove intent as a part of his prima facie case
for intentional tort, as the law would seem to require, then the defendant's
cognitive disability is entirely relevant to plaintiffs ability to meet his
burden of proof of establishing intent.1 4 0 Again, as was traditional for the
day, intent, for purposes of intentional torts and liability of defendants with
cognitive disabilities, appears to have been established from the
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 410.
Id
Id
Id at 409.
Id. at 410.
Id. (citing McIntyre v. Sholty, 13 N.E. 239 (Ill. 1887)).
McIntyre, 13 N.E. 239.
Id at 240.
Moore, 69 S.E. at 410 (citing Williams v. Hays, 38 N.E. 449 (N.Y. 1804); 1

THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE

171 (John Lewis ed., 3d ed. 1906); THOMAS G. SHERMAN
122 (5th ed. 1898)).

&

INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT

AMASA S. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE §

140. See supranotes 122-23 and accompanying text.
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defendant's conduct rather than from proof of the defendant's actual,
subjective state of mind.
In the 1938 case of Bryant v. Carrier,141 the plaintiff sued the
defendant, who had been declared "legally insane," 14 2 for alienation of
affections and criminal conversation.1 4 3 The twist to the case was that the
plaintiff wanted to recover punitive damages as well as compensatory
damages. 144
The court again stated the basic principle of the day that "[w]hile an
insane person is civilly liable for his torts, this liability is for compensatory
damages only, and does not include punitive damages."1 45 Then, the court
approved of the introduction of evidence relevant to the defendant's sanity,
but for purposes of proving the defendant had the capacity to act with the
aggravated intent necessary to support an award of punitive damages.1 46
These cases, products of their time, are suited for reexamination by
the North Carolina courts when the opportunity presents itself The
liability of a defendant with a cognitive disability should not be based on
the traditional conclusory statements of liability, but instead upon proof of
actual, subjective intent. Such proof requires the plaintiff to prove, often
with expert testimony, no doubt, that the defendant was capable of forming
the requisite intent for the tort at issue. This position does not change
existing law but only begs for the proper application of existing law.
B.

Single and DualIntent

As discussed earlier, certain courts take a single intent approach for
purposes of battery and require the plaintiff to prove only that the
defendant acted with the intent to cause contact with the plaintiff and that
the contact resulted in harm or offense.1 4 7 Other courts take a double intent
approach and require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted with the
intent to cause contact and with the intent to cause harm or offense.1 48

141.
142.
143.
144.

Bryant v. Carrier, 198 S.E. 619 (N.C. 1938).
Id. at 620.
Id.
Id.

145. Id. (citing Moore v. Horne, 69 S.E. 409 (N.C. 1910); Bollinger v. Rader, 69 S.E.

497 (N.C. 1910); Jewell v. Colby, 24 A. 902 (N.H. 1891)).
146. Id.
147. See supra Section I.C (discussing Wagner v. State, 122 P.3d 599 (Utah 2005);

White v. Univ. of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108 (Idaho 1990)).
148. See supra Section I.D (discussing White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814 (Colo. 2000) (en
banc)).
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Even if a court analyzes intent on an individual basis, requiring the
plaintiff to prove the defendant acted with the requisite subjective intent,
such a requirement is all but completely meaningless if the court takes a
single intent approach to liability for battery. This statement is true
regardless of whether the defendant does or does not have a cognitive

disability.
Requiring only intent to cause contact removes the fault and
blameworthiness that attaches to the double intent approach. Proof of
intent to cause contact would require little, if any, more than proof that the
defendant acted volitionally.
It does not appear the North Carolina appellate courts have been
squarely faced with the issue of whether to apply a single or double intent
approach. However, in a relatively recent decision by the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, the court included language to suggest a double intent
approach, if only tangentially.
In Andrews v. Peters,149 the defendant walked up behind the plaintiff
and used the front of his knee to bump the back of plaintiff's knee." 0 This
act caused the plaintiffs knee to buckle, upon which she fell and sustained
an injury.'' The plaintiff sued the defendant for assault and battery.15 2
While the issue before the Court of Appeals raised questions
pertaining to the recovery in tort from a co-employee, 5 3 the court had
occasion to address the required proof for battery.15 4
Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court noted that
"liability for the intentional tort of battery hinges on the defendant's intent
to cause a harmful or offensive contact."" The court further observed that
"[the defendant] does not deny that he intended to tap [the plaintiff] behind
the knee. Although tapping [the plaintiffs] knee was arguably not in and
of itself a harmful contact, it easily qualifies as an offensive contact."15 6
The language of the case strongly suggests a dual intent approach to
the tort of battery. Particularly instructive is the court's observation that
the defendant "intended" to tap the plaintiffs leg and that such a tap
qualifies as "offensive contact." 7 Thus, it would appear necessary for the

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Andrews v. Peters, 330 S.E.2d 638 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 639.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 640-41.
Id. at 641 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (AM.
Id.
Id.
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plaintiff to prove in this case that the defendant intended the contact and
that he intended the offense.'
The language of Andrews should serve as authority when the court
eventually finds itself in a position to address the issue head-on. The dual
intent approach is the fairer of the two approaches. It avoids creating
intentional tort liability for conduct that more fairly should be described as
merely negligent conduct or even innocent conduct, in which case the
liability becomes strict.
III. THE PLEA TO NORTH CAROLINA

The plea to North Carolina is relatively simple because it requires no
changes to the law of intentional torts, but only a clear approach to its
application.
Where the plaintiff brings suit for the intentional tort of battery, and
an issue of the defendant's cognitive disability is fairly raised, refrain from
relying on the conclusory maxim that "the insane are liable for their torts."
Instead, courts should require the plaintiff to specifically prove, most likely
through expert testimony, that the defendant was capable of forming the
requisite intent for the tort. Particularly, with regard to the intentional tort
of battery, require proof that the defendant both intended to cause contact
and, more importantly, that the defendant intended to cause harm or
offense.
The North Carolina cases cited earlier 5 9 and their reliance on the
conclusory and non-analytical statement that the "insane" are liable for
their intentional torts, without more, arose at a time when little was known
about cognitive disabilities. Naturally, there was some concern that a
defendant might fake a disability for more favorable treatment under the
law.1 60 "Today, in contrast to a century ago, with the assistance of manuals
and medical experts and with experience from other contexts, courts are
capable of separating those persons who experience a relevant cognitive
disability from those only claiming to experience one."161
Perhaps, the most practical and honest rationale for the rule that
"insanity is not a defense to intentional torts" is the concern that such a
defense would bring to the civil courts the substantive, procedural and
administrative difficulties that have plagued the criminal courts in regard to

158. See id.
159. See supra notes 127-46.
160. KEETON ET AL, supra note 12, § 135, at 1073 ("It has been said ... that since
insanity is easily feigned, there would be too much temptation to pretend it.").
161. Chriscoe & Lukasik, supranote 10, at 31.
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such defendants.1 6 2 True, a cognitive disability should not necessarily be a
defense to a civil action in an intentional tort such as battery, but the
plaintiff should prove as part of his prima facie case that the defendant with
a cognitive disability actually formed the requisite intent to commit the
intentional tort. Therefore, similar issues surface as would be present if
insanity was, in fact, a defense to intentional torts. Accordingly, the same
concerns about substantive, procedural and administrative nightmares
would again arise.
It has been noted, however, particularly in regard to distinguishing
legitimate from non-legitimate claims of cognitive disability, that "[c]ourts
already determine cognitive capability in the areas of contract, probate,
health care, family law, criminal law, and even primary negligence cases
involving children.,1 6 3
Though perhaps not an enviable task, the
assessment of a defendant with a cognitive disability and his capacity to act
with the intent to commit an intentional tort is a task necessary to the fair
and just application of the law of intentional torts. It is the rule of law.
Further, when faced with complex legal issues, North Carolina has
generally responded with innovative solutions to resolve such
complexities.1 6 4
By way of example, civil cases involving business world litigants no
doubt raise very specialized questions that require a certain level of
expertise and experience to fully comprehend. Rather than surrender to
such complexity, the North Carolina legislature created special Business
Courts 65 and filled its seats with the experienced judges and lawyers
necessary to fully evaluate and resolve these business issues.
Moreover, military veterans charged with criminal offenses who
suffer from post-traumatic stress and other disorders, no doubt create
unique legal issues as well as issues regarding their treatment and
rehabilitation. In response, North Carolina judges created special Veterans
Courtsl66 to resolve such intricate issues.

Perhaps in response to the substantive, procedural, and administrative
nightmares associated with the liability of defendants with cognitive
disabilities, it is now time to create special Mental Health Courts to fairly
resolve these problems. As with Business Courts and Veterans Courts,

162. McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760, 762 (Mass. 1937) ("[C]ourts are loath to introduce
into the great body of civil litigation the difficulties in determining mental capacity which it
has been found impossible to avoid in the criminal field.").
163. Chriscoe & Lukasik, supra note 10, at 30 (footnotes omitted).
164. See supranotes 4-5 and accompanying text.
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-45.3 (2015).
166. See Markham, supranote 5.
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Mental Health Courts would be frequented by judges, lawyers and other
experts necessary to resolve the tort liability of defendants with cognitive

disabilities.
Finally, there is the often stated concern that if the defendant with a
cognitive disability is excused from liability then the injured plaintiff will
not be compensated. The responses to this concern are multifaceted.
First, if a defendant with a cognitive disability is incapable of forming
the requisite intent to commit the intentional tort for which he has been
sued, he is not excused from liability. He simply is not liable in the first
instance under a fair application of the rule of law.
Second, in a primarily fault-based tort system, there will always be
injured plaintiffs who are not compensated by defendants who injured them
but without legal fault.
Third, the present traditional approach of finding liability of those
with cognitive disabilities based on the conclusory statement that the
"insane" are liable for their torts does not guarantee that the plaintiff will be
compensated, only that he will receive a judgment against the defendant.
Unless the defendant is financially secure, the plaintiff will not recover
from the defendant directly. Further, if the defendant was in some way
covered under liability insurance, such insurance would likely not benefit
the plaintiff because liability insurance policies generally excluded
intentional harm caused by the insured.1 67
Fourth, if the defendant with a cognitive disability is found not liable
because of the applications of the law of intentional torts suggested herein,
at least the plaintiffs medical expenses will likely be paid, in whole or in
part, by first-party medical insurance coverage.1 68
CONCLUSION

There is an inherent fairness to the intentional torts, chiefly because
the principles of law are the same for all defendants, whether young or old
and without regard to physical or cognitive disabilities.

167. See, e.g.,

ROBERT

E.

KEETON

&

ALAN

1.

WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW:

A

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES

GUIDE TO

§ 5.3(f), at

493-94 (Student ed. 1988) ("Losses which are intentionally caused by an insured generally
are not covered by liability insurance, and this rule applies even when there is no clause in
the applicable insurance policy that expressly excludes coverage for injuries intentionally
inflicted by an insured-that is, no coverage exists when a loss results from an intentional
tort which is not fortuitous from the point of view of the person whose interest the liability
insurance policy is designed to protect." (footnote omitted)).

168. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012)
(incentivizing the purchase of health care insurance coverage).
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However, the application of these rules of law, particularly in regard
to the essential element of intent, may result in unfounded liability for
defendants with cognitive disabilities because of the conclusory principle
that the "insane" are liable for their torts. The basic deduction of liability is
faulty in its logic because it conveniently skips the necessary proof of
actual and subjective intent: The insane are liable for their intentional torts.
This insane defendant injured the plaintiff. Therefore, this defendant is
liable. Missing is the legal analysis concluding that the "insane" defendant
intentionally caused injury to the plaintiff.
North Carolina legislators and judges have exhibited a willingness to
ignore national trends in the law or to lead new trends in the law when they
believe such decisions are reflective of the values of the citizens of the state
and consistent with sound legal reasoning. Hopefully, this Article will
inspire a similar willingness to fairly address the intentional tort liability of
defendants with cognitive disabilities.
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